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USE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
OF 1866 AND 1871 TO REDRESS
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION*
Roy L. Brookst
Over the past fifteen years, the United States has become offi-
cially committed to the goal of equal employment opportunity.'
Numerous statutes, 2 executive orders,3 and Civil Service Commis-
sion regulations4 have been promulgated to expressly prohibit dis-
crimination in employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or
* This Article was written while the author was a Law Clerk in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
t Member of the Pennsylvania Bar; B.A. 1972, University of Connecticut; J.D. 1975,
Yale Law School.
1 The government's policy of antidiscrimination in employment has been stated as fol-
lows: "It is the policy of the United States to insure equal employment opportunities . . .
without discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Federal
Antidiscrimination in Employment Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7151 (1970).
The denial of equal employment opportunity is generally viewed, at least among black
scholars, as the major cause of racial inequality in the United States. See e.g., D. BELL,
JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw 711 (1973). "[I]n a land where money is practically
synonymous with rights, power and respect, the central obstacle in the struggle for black
equality is economic. Removal of the disparity between black and white incomes would
enable blacks to purchase better housing (and therefore schooling), food and health ser-
vices. . . . With more and better jobs, participation in politics would increase, while the
incidence of crime and racist police practices would lessen." Id. See generally Ross, The Negro
in the American Economy, in EMPLOYMENT, RACE AND POVERTY (A. Ross & H. Hill eds. 1967).
2 E.g., Back Pay Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 5596
(Supp. V 1975); Federal Antidiscrimination in Employment Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1752,
7154 (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7152, 7154 (Supp. V 1975); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 200 0e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended, Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975). There are also
many state and local statutory provisions designed to effectuate the policy of equal em-
ployment opportunities. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 40-a, 40-c, 40-d, 41-45 (McKin-
ney 1976).
'E.g., Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app.
(1970); Exec. Order No. 11478, 3 C.F.R. 207 (1974), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app.
(1970). Executive Orders are accorded the force and effect of law. See, e.g., Lichter v.
United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785 (1948); Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629,
632 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d
3, 8 (3d Cir. 1964).4 E.g., 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.201-.283 (1976), implementing Exec. Order No. 11478, 3 C.F.R.
207 (1974), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. (1970); 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1 to 60-60.9 (1976),
implementing Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
app. (1970).
1977] REDRESSING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 259
national origin. 5 Prominent among these measures are Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 19646 and its 1972 amendments, 7 which
established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and
created civil remedies for acts of employment discrimination. 8
Little attention, however, has been given to important statu-
tory provisions derived from the Civil Rights Acts of 18669 and
187110 (the "Reconstruction Acts")-namely, sections 1981,11
1983,12 and 1985(3) 13 of Title 42, United States Code' 4-which col-
lectively proscribe the deprivation of civil rights, whether by state
or private action. 5 Although these provisions do not expressly
prohibit discrimination in employment, they can be used to redress
such discriminatory practices in both the public' 6 and private sec-
tors. Significantly, actions under sections 1981, 1983, and 1985(3)
5 In addition to these specific provisions, the Supreme Court has held that the prohibi-
tion against discrimination by the federal government is grounded in the fifth amendment
due process clause. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Title VII].
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter cited as EEO Act o
1972 or 1972 Amendments].
I The Equal Employment Opportunities Commission [hereinafter referred to as
EEOC] is an executive agency empowered to prevent the occurrence of discriminatory em-
ployment practices. EEO Act of 1972, § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (Supp. V 1975). See
also Title VII, §§ 703-704, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-3 (1970), as amended, EEO Act of
1972, § 8(a)-(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-3 (Supp. V 1975). To this end, the EEOC
may receive complaints of discrimination from private (nongovernment) employees, file
complaints of discrimination on behalf of these individuals, investigate charges of discrimi-
nation, and, pursuant to a finding of reasonable cause, endeavor to eliminate the unlawful
employment practice by informal or "voluntary compliance," methods of conference, con-
ciliation, and persuasion. Title VII, § 706(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970), as amended, EEO
Act of 1972, § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975). Failing that, the EEOC may
(1) bring a civil action against the person or persons engaged in the discriminatory em-
ployment practice; or (2) intervene in a civil action brought by a charging party against
the person or persons engaged in such employment practice. Title VII, § 706(e), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e), as amended, EEO Act of 1972, § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (Supp. V 1975).
'Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, reenacted by the Enforcement Act of
1870, Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16 & 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144.
10 Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, §§ I & 2, 17 Stat, 13-14. The statute is set out in
pertinent part at note 25 infra.
"1 Set out in full in text accompanying note 26 infra.
12 Set out in full in text accompanying note 32 infra.
13 Set out in pertinent part in text accompanying note 36 infra.
14 Professor Bell, for example, briefly mentions § 1981 as an alternative to Title VII
but does not provide an extensive analysis of that or the other provisions. See D. BELL, supra
note 1, at 754-56.
15 See notes 22-49 and accompanying text infra.
16 However, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Brown v. General Services Ad-
ministration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Brown v. GSA] will make it
more difficult for federal employees to file employment discrimination suits under the
Reconstruction Acts. See notes 187-209 and accompanying text infra.
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are free of two important limitations on actions under Title VII.
First, a Title VII cause of action is unavailable to parties who fail to
file complaints within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory
episode, or in the case of federal employees, within thirty days. 17
In contrast, a cause of action under the Reconstruction Acts runs
as long as the applicable statute of limitations-a matter of several
years in most cases.' 8 Second, a successful plaintiff under the Re-
construction Acts can recover punitive damages, while Title VII
plaintiffs are normally limited to backpay awards and compensa-
tory damages.' 9
Thus, in some cases, the Reconstruction Acts offer relief un-
available under the more recently enacted statutes. This is not to
say that sections 1981, 1983, and 1985(3) can or should preempt
Title VII, which is still the dominant law in the area of employ-
ment discrimination. The inertia of discriminatory traditions, how-
ever, can only be curtailed by using a "full arsenal" of statutory
weapons20 Moreover, it is prudent for an attorney to file suit un-
der more than one statutory provision, so as to assure survival of
the action beyond the pretrial stage and maximize the chances
for success at trial.2 1
The purpose of this Article is to explore the points of law
relevant to the use of the Reconstruction Acts in the battle against
employment discrimination. The Article begins with a brief exami-
nation of the legislative history of these provisions (Part I), and
then proceeds with an analysis of the averments that a complaint
must contain in order to state a cause of action under each provi-
sion (Part II). Part III presents an exposition of issues likely to
1742 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e), 2000e-5(f)(1), 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1975); 5 C.F.R.
§ 713.214(a)(1)(i) (1976).
IS See notes 210-15 and accompanying text infra.
"9See notes 216-23 and accompanying text infra. The following cases deal with vari-
ous requirements for Title VII actions (grouped by issues): (1) conditions precedent to
filing suit-Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975); DeMatteis v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1975); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357
(7th Cir. 1968); (2) timely filing of the administrative complaint-Molybdenum Corp. of
America v. EEOC, 457 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1972); Malone v. North Am. Rockwell Corp.,
457 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1972); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th
Cir. 1969); (3) timely filing of the civil action-Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 385 F.
Supp. 184 (E.D. Mo. 1974), rev'd, 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052
(1976); and (4) requisite number of persons employed-Williams v. New Orleans S.S.
Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. La. 1972).
21 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 468 (1975) (Marshall, Doug-
las & Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21 See notes 50-53 and accompanying text infra.
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arise in litigation of employment discrimination claims under sec-
tions 1981, 1983, and 1985(3).
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
For the purposes of this Article, it is unnecessary to consider at
great length the legislative history of sections 1981, 1983, and
1985(3).22 To understand the mechanics of these statutory provi-
sions relative to employment discrimination one need only under-
stand the constitutional foundations of each section. This requires
consideration of the parent provisions of each section-the Civil
Rights Acts of 186623 and 1871.24
The operative language of section 1981, traceable to section 1
of the Act of April 9, 1866,5 states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of per-
sons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other.26
The Act of 1866 rested on the enabling clause of the thirteenth
amendment 27 and was enacted before the fourteenth amendment
22 For a detailed discussion of the legislative history, see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968) (§§ 1981 & 1982); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (§ 1983);
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (§ 1985(3)).
2' See note 9 supra.
24 See note 10 supra.
22 Section 1 of the Act of 1866 provided in pertinent part:
That all persons born in the United States ... of every race and color ... shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishmen.t, pains, and
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to
the contrary notwithstanding.
14 Stat. 27 (1866). See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422 n.28 (1968).
26 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. Sections 1 and 2 of the thirteenth amendment pro-
vide:
SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
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was even formally proposed. 8 Since the thirteenth amendment
may be violated in the absence of state action, 29 section 1981
reaches discriminatory actions taken by private parties.3 0
In contrast, section 1983 is of limited scope, and applicable to
state action only.3' It states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 2
Section 1983, derived from section 1 of the Act of April 20, 187 13
SECTION 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640
(1883); United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322, 323 (E.D. Ark. 1903).
28 See United States v. Price, 283 U.S. 787, 804 (1966); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24,
32 n.ll (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).
29 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 438 (1968); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1906); Clyatt v. United States,
197 U.S. 207, 216 (1905). See also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971); United
States v. Morris, 125 F. 322, 323-24 (E.D. Ark. 1903).
30 See cases cited in note 29 supra; Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
454, 459-60 (1975) (Marshall, Douglas & Brennan, JJ., concurring). See also District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 422-23 (1973); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 422-26 (1968) (both cases construing § 1982, sister provision to § 1981). Although it
cannot be said that only blacks can benefit from the thirteenth amendment's protection, it
is necessary in defining the extent of the amendments protection to look to its "pervading
spirit"-i.e., the evil it was designed to remedy-and "the process of continued addition to
the Constitution." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873).
31 District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1973). See Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 171, 181-85 (1961); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 163, 166-67
(1970); United States ex rel. Diamond v. Social Serv. Dep't, 263 F. Supp. 971, 973 (E.D. Pa.
1967).
32 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
33 See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 171 (1961). Section 1 of the Act of 1871 provided in part:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person
within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall,
any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the
contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted
in the several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the
same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like
cases in such courts, under the provisions of the act of the ninth of April, eight-
een hundred and sixty-six, entitled "An act to protect all persons in the United
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(also known as the Klu Klux Klan Act of 1871), was passed pur-
suant to the enabling clause of the fourteenth amendment 34 and
borrows language directly from that amendment.3
5
Section 1985(3) states in pertinent part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or
go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for
the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any per-
son or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws; ... in any case
of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons
engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance
of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in
his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so
injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of dam-
ages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one
or more of the conspirators.
36
Like section 1983, section 1985(3) traces its source to the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, specifically section 2 of that Act.37 The primary
States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication"; and the
other remedial laws of the United States which are in their nature applicable in
such cases.
17 Stat. 13 (1871).
34 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423
(1973); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 545 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 171 (1961). Sections 1 and 5 of the fourteenth amendment provide:
SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
SECTION 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.
35 See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 695-96 (1898).
s6 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970).
'7 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 98-99 (1971). Section 2 of the Act of 1871
provided:
That if two or more persons within any State or Territory of the United States
shall conspire together to... oppose by force the authority of the government of
the United States, or by force, intimidation, or threat to prevent, hinder, or delay
the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess
any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, or by force,
intimidation, or threat to prevent any person from accepting or holding any office
or trust or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging the
264 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:258
purpose of the Act was to aid in the enforcement of fourteenth
duties thereof, or by force, intimidation, or threat to induce any officer of the
United States to leave any State, district, or place where his duties as such officer
might lawfully be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on ac-
count of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or to injure his person
while engaged in the lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or to injure his
property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his
official duty, or by force, intimidation, or threat to deter any party or witness in
any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying in
any matter pending in such court fully, freely, and truthfully, or to injure any
such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so at-
tended or testified, or by force, intimidation, or threat to influence the verdict,
presentment, or indictment, of any juror or grand juror in any court of the
United States, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any
verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or on account of
his being or having been such juror, or shall conspire together, or go in disguise
upon the public highway or upon the premises of another for the purpose, either
directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or any class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws, or for
the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State
from giving or securing to all persons within such State the equal protection of
the laws, or shall conspire together for the purpose of in any manner impeding,
hindering, obstructing, or defeating the due course of justice in any State or Ter-
ritory, with intent to deny to any citizen of ihe United States the due and equal
protection of the laws, or to injure any person in his person or his property for
lawfully enforcing the right of any person or class of persons to the equal protec-
tion of the laws, or by force, intimidation, or threat to prevent any citizen of the
United States lawfully entitled to vote from giving his support or advocacy in a
lawful manner towards or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person
as an elector of President or Vice-President of the United States, or as a member
of the Congress of the United States, or to injure any such citizen in his person or
property on account of such support or advocacy, each and every person so of-
fending shall be deemed guilty of a high crime, and, upon conviction thereof in
any district or circuit court of the United States or district or supreme court of
any Territory of the United States having jurisdiction of similar offences, shall be
punished by a fine not less than five hundred nor more than five thousand dol-
lars, or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, as the court may determine,
for a period of not less than six months nor more than six years, as the court may
determine, or by both such fine and imprisonment as the court shall determine.
And if any one or more persons engaged in any such conspiracy shall do, or cause
to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby any
person shall be injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the person so
injured or deprived of such rights and privileges may have and maintain an action
for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation of rights
and privileges against any one or more of the persons engaged in such conspiracy,
such action to be prosecuted in the proper district or circuit court of the United
States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and oth-
er remedies provided in like cases in such courts under the provisions of the act
of April ninth, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled "An act to protect all per-
sons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their
vindication."
17 Stat. 13-14 (1871).
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amendment rights. 38 It would seem reasonable to conclude, there-
fore, that section 1985(3) protects solely against state action, and in
fact the Supreme Court at one time adopted this position.39 In
Griffin v. Breckenidge,4 ° however, the Court later expressed the
view that limiting section 1985(3) to state action would deprive its
sister provision, section 1983, of all independent effect.4' The
Court also analogized section 1985(3) to its criminal counterpart, 42
and concluded that section 1985(3) applies to all deprivations,
"whatever their source, ''43 and that its constitutional basis is the
enabling clause of the thirteenth amendment. 44 The Court's hold-
ing does not mean that the enabling clause of the fourteenth
amendment 45 provides no constitutional basis for a section 1985(3)
cause of action.46 Since the parent provision of section 1985(3) 41
was passed pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, it is clear that
38 See cases cited in note 34 supra.
19 Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951). But see note 43 infra.
40 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
41 1d. at 98-99.
42 d. at 98, 104. The criminal statute to which the court referred is 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1970), which reads:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to
him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so
exercised the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of
another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege so secured-
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any
term of years or for life.
As stated by Justice Frankfurter's plurality opinion in United States v. Williams, 341
U.S. 70 (1951), the purpose of § 241 of Title 18 is "to reach private action rather than
officers of a State acting under its authority." 341 U.S. at 76. The criminal counterpart to
§ 1983 is 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970), which provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties,
on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race,
than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death results shall
be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
43 403 U.S. at 97. The Court thereby disapproved its prior construction of § 1985(3)
given in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951). See 403 U.S. at 93-96.
4 403 U.S. at 104-05. The thirteenth amendment is set out at note 27 supra.
4' See note 34supra.
46 The allegations in the complaint in Griffin did not require consideration of the scope
of the power of Congress under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 403 U.S. at 107.
47 Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13; set out at note 37 supra.
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a section 1985(3) cause of action may be predicated upon that
amendment; and the courts, in interpreting Griffin, have so held.4"
To summarize: section 1981, having its basis in section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, which is based on the enabling clause of
the thirteenth amendment, protects against infringement by any-
one. These rights, however, may not be as broad as the rights
protected by the fourteenth amendment. Section 1983, traceable to
section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which was passed pur-
suant to the enabling clause of the fourteenth amendment, protects
against state action only. Finally, section 1985(3), derived from sec-
tion 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which finds its authority
in the enabling clauses of both the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments, protects against infringement by private, state, or
federal action, depending on the source of the right violated. 9
II
ALLEGING CLAIMS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE RECONSTRUCTION ACTS
In order to withstand motions to dismiss for failure to state
a cause of action, 0 or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 51 a
complaint under the Reconstruction Acts must be carefully
drafted. Although "notice" pleading is technically sufficient under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 52 some courts impose more
demanding standards in civil rights actions in order to identify and
dismiss frivolous Suits. 5 3 The required allegations vary depending
on the particular section(s) being invoked.
48 Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 194-95 (7th Cir. 1972).
This is particularly significant because it means that Griffin did not obviate the require-
ment of state involvement in alleging a § 1985(3) cause of action where the right violated
arises under the fourteenth amendment. See notes 88-122 and accompanying text infra.
In other words, a showing of state involvement remains necessary under § 1985(3) where
the asserted deprivation involves the fourteenth amendment. See notes 102-09 and accom-
panying text infra.
49 In recent years the Supreme Court's approach in interpreting civil rights statutes of
the Reconstruction Period has been to "accord [them] a sweep as broad as [their] lan-
guage." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 437 (1968); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966).
50 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
51 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
52 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8. See also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
53 See Downs v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 368 F. Supp. 454, 463 (E.D. Pa. 1973),
quoting Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960-61 (D. Conn. 1968):
[Vol. 62:258
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A. Section 1981
In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,54 the Supreme Court stated
that "the right to contract for employment [is] a right secured by
42 U.S.C. § 1981 . . . . 55 Because "the main thrust of § 1981 is to
prohibit discrimination based upon race, '56 it is settled that section
1981 creates a cause of action in cases of racial discrimination in
employment. 57 Thus, to state a cause of action for employment
discrimination under section 1981, a complaint need only allege,
with some specificity, 58 a racial basis for such discrimination.
The courts are not in agreement on the extent to which section
1981 embraces non-racial discriminatory practices such as dis-
crimination based on alienage 59 or sex.6" Although the Supreme
In recent years there has been an increasingly large volume of cases brought
under the Civil Rights Acts. A substantial number of these cases are frivolous or
should be litigated in the State courts; they all cause defendants-public officials,
policemen and citizens alike-considerable expense, vexation and perhaps un-
founded notoriety. It is an important public policy to weed out the frivolous and
insubstantial cases at any [sic] early stage in the litigation, and still keep the doors
of the federal courts open to legitimate claims.
368 F. Supp. at 463. See also Rodes v. Municipal Auth., 409 F.2d 16, 17 (3d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 861 (1969); United States ex rel. Hoge v. Bolsinger, 311 F.2d 215, 216 (3d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 931 (1963). But see Johnson v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354, 355
(4th Cir. 1969); Shock v. Tester, 405 F.2d 852, 854 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1020
(1969); Barnes v. Merritt, 376 F.2d 8, 11 (5th Cir. 1967).
The allegations of a complaint must be accepted as true for purposes of considering a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b). Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972); 2AJ. MOORE,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.08, at 2266-67 (2d ed. 1975).
54 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
55 Id. at 442 n.78. Indeed, this is indicated by examining the legislative history of the
EEO Act of 1972 in which Congress noted "that the remedies available to the individual
under Title VII are coextensive with the indivdual's [sic] right to sue under the provisions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 .... " H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 19 (1971). Later, in considering the EEO Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(Supp. V 1975), which extensively amended Tide VII, the Senate rejected an amendment
that would have deprived a claimant of any right to sue under § 1981. 118 CONG. REC.
3371-73 (1972).
56 Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, No. 74-1313, at 3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1976). See
also cases and discussion in notes 25 & 28 supra.
5 7Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975); Sanders v.
Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (5th Cir. 1970).5 8 See notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra.
'9 Without apparent exception, courts have interpreted § 1981 as also prohibiting dis-
crimination based upon alienage. See, e.g., Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d
641, 653-54 (5th Cir. 1974); Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 12
(E.D. Pa. 1975); Troy v. Shell Oil Co., 378 F. Supp. 1042, 1046 (E.D. Mich. 1974), appeal
dismissed as moot, 519 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1975).
60 The courts have been virtually unanimous in ruling that sex discrimination claims
are outside the parameters of § 1981. See Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 522
F.2d 1235, 1240 n.8 (7th Cir. 1975); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 477 F.2d 1, 8 (3d
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Court has not decided this issue, it is reasonable to assume that it
would opt for a fairly broad interpretation. In Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., the Court observed that the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866,61 the parent provision of section 1981,62
"leaves no doubt that, if we are to give [the law] the scope that its
origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its lan-
guage. ' 63 Moreover, the coverage of section 1981 must ultimately
be determined by reference to the thirteenth amendment, the
constitutional foundation of section 1981 and its parent.6 4 The
Supreme Court has declared that while the thirteenth amendment
is not limited to the protection of blacks, it is necessary, in ascer-
taining the extent of the amendment's protection, to look to the
purpose or "pervading spirit" behind the evil which it was designed
to remedy, and to "the process of continued addition to the
Constitution. 6 5
Finally, jurisdiction for a section 1981 cause of action may be
properly invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4).66 No monetary
minimum is necessary to sustain jurisdiction under that section.6 7
Cir. 1973) (concurring opinion); Raether v. Phillips, 401 F. Supp. 1391, 1396 (W.D. Va.
1975); Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 13 n.II (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992, 1008-09 (E.D. Pa. 1974); O'Connell v.
Teachers College, 63 F.R.D. 638, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Troy v. Shell Oil Co., 378 F. Supp.
1042, 1046 (E.D. Mich. 1974); League of Academic Women v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 343 F. Supp. 636, 638-40 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 343 F.
Supp. 836, 837-38 (W.D. Pa. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 477 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973);
Fitzgerald v. United Methodist Community Center, 335 F. Supp. 965, 966 (D. Neb. 1972).
6 Set out in relevant part at note 25 supra.
" See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
63 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968), quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966).
64 See notes 25-30 and accompanying text supra.
65 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872).
66 Bowers v. Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1974). 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4)
(1970) reads: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person: . . . (4) to recover damages or to secure
equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil
rights .... " Because § 1981 is a "law" of the United States, jurisdiction for § 1981 could
arguably be based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) if the amount in controversy exceeds
$10,000, exclusive of interest and cost. Section 1331(a) provides that "[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds
the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitu-
tion, laws, or treaties of the United States." However, it must also be noted that only
§ 1343(4) empowers federal courts to entertain a § 1981 action for damages or equitable
relief; § 1331(a) does not on its face grant such competency. See R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN,
CIVIL PROCEDURE 122 (3d ed. 1973); See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3573 (1975).
67 Bowers v. Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1974), citing Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 463-65 (1974).
[Vol. 62:258
1977] REDRESSING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 269
B. Section 1983
Section 1983 reaches employment discrimination at the state
and municipal governmental levels. 68 But unlike section 1981, it
has been seldom used to redress employment discrimination.
A complaint stating a section 1983 cause of action must allege,
in addition to jurisdiction, 69 a deprivation, under color of state
law, 70 of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to the plaintiff by
the Constitution or federal law.7 ' A deprivation of rights secured
solely by state law will not sustain an action under section 1983.72
Unlike section 1981, section 1983 provides a vicarious cause of
action-the operative cause of action arises from the constitutional
or federal right, privilege, or immunity violated.7 3 Thus, to with-
stand a motion to dismiss,7 4 the complaint must allege, in addition
to action under color of state law, the elements constituting a cause
of action under the particular federal right violated. 75 To illustrate:
6 These claims are generally redressed under Title VII through civil actions l6rought
by the Department of Justice in which the aggrieved party is given the right to intervene.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975). Depending upon the relief sought, Title VII
may be the most effective vehicle for overcoming the problem of immunity which arises
when an individual attempts to sue a state or its political subdivisions. See notes 123-53 and
accompanying text infra.69 See note 86 and accompanying text infra.
71 "Under color of state law" has been treated as equivalent to the state action re-
quirement of the fourteenth amendment. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794-95 n.7
(1966). Any discussion of the "protean concept" (Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60
COLuM. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (1960)) of state action must begin with the Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883). There, the Supreme Court enunciated, for the first time, the principle
that "[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [fourteenth]
amendment." Id. at 11. That amendment, on which § 1983 is based, only prohibits "[sltate
action of a particular character." Id. Notwithstanding that principle, subsequent decisions
of the Supreme Court have found state action in private individual conduct in at least
three general categories: (1) where state courts enforce an agreement affecting private
parties (see, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)); (2) where there is private perfor-
mance of a governmental function (see, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)); and (3)
where the state "significantly" involves itself with the private party (see, e.g., Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1309, 1310-12
(1973)).
"' See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944).
72 See Brown v. Wilson, 373 F. Supp. 1045 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Lopez v. Williams, 372 F.
Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (three-judge court), aff'd, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
13 Cf. Milner v. National School of Health Tech., 409 F. Supp. 1389, 1394-95 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (assertion of Title VII violation held sufficient allegation of federally-created right
under § 1985(3)). See note 105 infra.
7 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b); notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra.
15See Hochman v. Board of Educ., No. 75-1402 (3d Cir., April 22, 1976);" Eisen v.
Eastern, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
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It is alleged that an employee of a quasi-state-owned and -operated
racetrack has been summarily and permanently discharged by an
official and employee of the racetrack for possessing a narcotic
drug while working on the premises, although no drug was ever
found in the employee's possession. 76 In such a case, the constitu-
tional deprivation consists of a denial of the right to ply one's
trade-a right derived from the due process clauses of the four-
teenth and fifth amendments.7 7 In order to state a cause of action
to redress this deprivation, the plaintiff must allege: (1) state
action, 8 (2) a protected interest, in this case, "liberty" or "prop-
erty, 79 and (3) unreasonable conduct by the state.8 ' Therefore,
to state a cause of action for a deprivation of the right to ply one's
trade, it must be alleged that the state, or one acting under color
of state law, has unreasonably deprived the plaintiff of the right to
liberty or property.81
In addition to the constitutional right to ply one's trade, either
section 1981 or Title V11 82 can satisfy the operative cause of action
requirement for section 1983. These provisions confer rights, se-
cured to state and municipal employees by federal law, a violation
of which can give rise to a section 1983 cause of action. 3 The first
and fourteenth amendments may also provide the basis for a claim
under section 1983.84 Indeed, such multiple pleading may well be
the most effective way in which counsel for the plaintiff can con-
6 See Whetzler v. Krause, 411 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
" See id.; Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959); cf. New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann, 285 U.S. 262 (1931) (state licensing requirements held repugnant to due process
clause).
" See, e.g., Whetzler v. Krause, 411 F. Supp. 523, 526 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
"
5 See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959); Whetzler v. Krause, 411 F.
Supp. 523, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1976); cf. Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 98 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974) (allegation of deprivation of liberty or property held neces-
sary to sustain claim of denial of due process).
8 United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1975), citing Greene v. McElroy,
360 U.S. 474, 492-93 (1959); Whetzler v. Krause, 411 F. Supp. 523, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
81 Whetzler v. Krause, 411 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. Pa. 1976), from which this illustration is
taken, cannot be properly viewed as an employment discrimination case. The plaintiff in
Whetzler did not expressly allege employment discrimination in connection with his § 1983
claim. Instead, he alleged a violation of fourteenth amendment due process. Nevertheless,
the case clearly demonstrates the process of alleging the operative cause of action necessary
to the statement of a claim under § 1983 and § 1985(3). See notes 88-122 and accompany-
ing text infra.
82 Title VII reaches employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
8' See Scott v. University of Del., 385 F. Supp. 937, 944-45 (D. Del. 1974).
84See Hochman v. Board of Educ., No. 75-1402 (3d Cir., Apr. 22, 1976); Plano
v. Baker, 504 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1974); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 477 F.2d 1, 3
(3d Cir. 1973); cf. Milner v. National School of Health Tech., 409 F. Supp. 1389 (E.D. Pa.
1977] REDRESSING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 271
struct a complaint charging employment discrimination in violation
of section 1983; it gives the plaintiff several bases for opposing
defendant's motion to dismiss, while at the same time increasing
the latter's burden in pursuing its motion and, ultimately, in pre-
vailing at trial.85
The jurisdictional basis for section 1983 is provided in 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3). 86 Thus, no monetary minimum is necessary to
sustain jurisdiction. 87
C. Section 1985(3)
Section 1985(3) reaches employment discrimination in all
sectors-private and public. As with section 1983, however, the law
governing the use of section 1985(3) to redress discriminatory em-
ployment practices is embryonic. In order to state a cause of action
under section 1985(3), the plaintiff must allege (1) a conspiracy, (2)
behind which is a "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based invid-
iously discriminatory animus,"88 the purpose or object of which
is the deprivation of equal protection of the laws, and (3) which
results in injury to the plaintiff.89 To properly plead a section
1985(3) cause of action, it is necessary to understand the nature of
the conspiracy, the plaintiff, the deprivation, and the injury con-
templated by section 1985(3).
1. Conspiracy
The essence of a section 1985(3) conspiracy is an agreement to
deprive a protected race or class"0 of the equal protection of the
1976) (assertion of Title VII violation held sufficient allegation of federal rights under
§ 1985(3)), discussed in note 105 infra.85 See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
86 See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 463-65, 472-73 (1974); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961). 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any persons...
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by
the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States.
'
t See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 463-65, 472-73 (1974); cf. Bowers v. Camp-
bell, 505 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1974) (§ 1981).
88 Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247, 1249 (3d Cir. 1971), quoting Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
89 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971); Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d
1247, 1249 (3d Cir. 1971); Flores v. Yeska, 372 F. Supp. 35, 38 (E.D. Wis. 1974).9 See note 98 infra.
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laws. 9 1 The plaintiff must plead specific facts 92 which demonstrate
that one of the alleged co-conspirators committed "any act in
furtherance of the object of [the] conspiracy,"9 3 and that all con-
spirators "shared in the knowledge and design of the conspiracy.
'94
Failure to "adequately show this in the complaint signifies that the
cause of action must fail."
9 5
Where the defendant named in the complaint is a single busi-
ness entity, the statutory requirement of a conspiracy between "two
or more persons" is not satisfied by proof that two or more offi-
cers, employees, or agents of the business entity participated in the
discriminatory conduct. 96 The plaintiff can overcome this problem
by alleging that the officers, employees, or agents of the business
entity engaged in an ongoing pattern or practice of discrimina-
tion.97 Such a pattern or practice constitutes an entirely separate
ground for alleging conspiracy under section 1985(3), and is dis-
tinct from the "two or more person" conspiracy cited above.
2. Plaintiff
In order to bring suit under section 1985(3), the plaintiff must
be a member of a race or class protected by that section. 98 If a
91 Collins v. Bensinger, 374 F. Supp. 273, 277 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1405 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1058 (1975).
92 See notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra. See alao Robinson v. McCorkle, 462
F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972); Blackburn v. Fisk Univ. 443
F.2d 121, 124 (6th Cir. 1971). It is advisable to plead the facts with no less specificity than
in the complaint in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 103 (1971) and Richardson v.
Miller, 446 F.2d 1247, 1248 n.1 (3d Cir. 1971).
93 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 103 (1971), qutoing 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970).
94 Flores v. Yeska, 372 F. Supp. 35, 39 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
5 1d. at 39, citing Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1933); Dombrowski v. Dowling,
459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972).
96 Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 505 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1974); Dombrowski v.
Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1972). See Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 384 F.
Supp. 202, 205 (N.D. Il1. 1974), aff'd, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
943 (1976). See also Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th
Cir. 1952).
97 Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992, 1005-06 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
98 It is unclear what constitutes a "protected race or class" within the meaning of
§ 1985(3). Griffin left open the question of whether § 1985(3) is applicable solely to
discrimination against blacks. 403 U.S. at 102, n.9. See also Hughes v. Ranger Fuel Corp.,
467 F.2d 6, 9 (4th Cir. 1972); Stern v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp.
433, 443 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The legislative history of § 1985(3) does not foreclose an action
based on discrimination involving a nonracial classification, and several courts have allowed
such actions. See McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 870, 875-76 (5th Cir.
1976) (bankrupts); Stern v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., supra at 443 (sex dis-
crimination). See also Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973) (political opponents);
40 FORBHAM L. REV. 635, 642 (1972); 47 WASH. L. REV. 353, 359-60 (1972). In determin-
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plaintiff is not a member of a protected race or class, he may be
entitled to file suit under section 1985(3) if he is an advocate of the
rights of a protected race or class and sustains immediate injury to
his person or property as a result of such advocacy. 99 For example,
an employee who is not a member of the class discriminated
against but who alleges that he was discharged from his employ-
ment because he sought, to express "views criticizing and opposing
what he believed to be... racially discriminating [sic] employment
practices"' 00 may be entitled to bring a section 1985(3) cause of
action.10
3. Deprivation
The conspirators' actions must be animated by an invidious
discriminatory intent. 10 2 This means that the conspiracy must be
designed to deprive the protected race or class of rights secured by
the Constitution or by federal law. 10 3
Section 1985(3), like section 1983, provides a vicarious cause of
action' 04-the operative cause of action arises from the particular
deprivation of rights alleged in the complaint. 0 5 Thus, the nature
of the right or privilege belonging to the protected race or class,'0 6 the
ing whether a protected interest has been properly asserted in a § 1985(3) cause of action
for employment discrimination, the focal point of the court's analysis should be whether
the discrimination is "invidious"-e.g., based upon race, color, sex, religion, or national
origin. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The same is true of other
enactments designed to effectuate the national policy against employment discrimination.
See notes 1-8 and accompanying textsupra.
9' Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 103 (1971); Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d
1247, 1249 (3d Cir. 1971); Whetzler v. Krause, 411 F. Supp. 523, 528-29 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
100 Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247, 1249 (3d Cir. 1971).
101 Id. at 1249.
102 Id.
103 Id., quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). See Cohen v. Illinois
Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976).
10' See notes 73-81 and accompanying textsupra.
"0' See Milner v. National School of Health Tech., 409 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (E.D. Pa.
1976), relying on Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975). The various
federal antidiscrimination enactments (discussed at notes 1-8 and accompanying textsupra),
constitute federally protected rights under § 1985(3). See, e.g., Milner v. National School of
Health Tech., 409 F. Supp. at 1395:
[I~n this [§ 1985(3)] case, plaintiff asserts that her dismissal violated Title VII ....
That statute prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex by private
employers. Therefore, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the deprivation of a feder-
ally protected right under § 1985(3).
See also notes 82-85 and accompanying text supra.
10" The plaintiff wishing to gain access to the federal courts under § 1985(3) by virtue
of his advocacy of the rights of a protected race or class must allege that the defendants
have attempted to deprive the members of their federal rights. See Richardson v. Miller,
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deprivation of which is the object of the conspiracy, will determine
the character of a plaintiff's cause of action. For example, where
the asserted deprivation involves the fourteenth amendment, such
as a claim of sex discrimination,10 7 a showing of state action is a
necessary element of the section 1985(3) cause of action.'1 8 On the
other hand, a showing of state action is not a necessary element of
a section 1985(3) cause of action if the alleged deprivation is of
thirteenth amendment rights, such as a claim of racial discrimina-
tion, because state action is not a requisite element of a cause of
action under the thirteenth amendment. 10
9
The requirement that one must allege deprivation of a feder-
ally guaranteed right or privilege also points to another important
feature of section 1985(3). Unlike section 1983, section 1985(3)
reaches nonracial discrimination by the federal government."0
The fifth amendment due process clause-clearly an appropriate
source for a section 1985(3) cause of action-prohibits the federal
government from discriminating on the basis of color, religion, sex,
or national origin, as well as race.' A female federal employee
446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971); Milner v. National School of Health Tech., 409 F. Supp.
1389, 1394 (E.D. Pa. 1976). This is the same allegation required of a member of the pro-
tected race or class itself in order to sustain an action under § 1985(3).
107 The right to be free from gender-based discrimination can also derive from fifth
amendment due process. See notes 110-13 and accompanying text infra. To this extent,
fourteenth amendment equal protection and fifth amendment due process overlap.
108 See Milner v. National School of Health Tech., 409 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (E.D. Pa.
1976), where the court stated: "[I]f the right is one which is protected only against infringe-
ment by the state government, e.g., the fourteenth amendment, there must be a sufficient
allegation of state action." As Judge (now Justice) Stevens pointed out in Cohen v. Illinois
Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 829 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976), some
courts, without careful consideration of the issue, have cited Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88 (1971), for the proposition that state action is never necessary in a § 1985(3) cause
of action. See, e.g., Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 408 (2d Cir. 1975); Richardson v.
Miller, 446 F.2d 1247, 1249 (3d Cir. 1971). The plaintiff did not have to allege state action
in Griffin because the charge of racial discrimination brought the case within the thirteenth
amendment and because the claim of infringement of the right to interstate travel can be
asserted against private individuals as well as against the state. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88, 105-06 (1971). To this extent, the requirements of a § 1985(3) cause of action are
identical to those of a § 1983 cause of action. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
Where a claim of sex discrimination is brought against a federal employer under the fifth
amendment (see notes 110-13 and accompanying text infra) there is, of course, no require-
ment that plaintiff allege state action.
109 Milner v. National School of Health Tech., 409 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (E.D. Pa.
1976), citing Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 943 (1976). In this sense, the requirements of a § 1985(3) cause of action are
identical to those of a § 1981 cause of action. See notes 57-59 and accompanying text supra.
110 Section 1983 reaches conduct under color of state law only. See note 70 and accom-
panying text supra.
"I Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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may thus be able to seek redress against some aspects of gender-
based discrimination in federal employment, 1 12 provided that she
satisfies the other elements of a section 1985(3) cause of action." 3
4. Injury
Section 1985(3) requires that the plaintiff sustain a direct and
immediate injury "in his person or property."' 1 4 Both a plaintiff
who is a member of a protected race or class discriminated against
or one who merely advocates the rights of such a race or class must
meet this requirement." 5 Where the plaintiff is an advocate rather
than a member of a protected race or class, the complaint must
allege, in addition to the requisite deprivation, 116 that plaintiff has
sustained injury as a consequence of such advocacy. 117
5. Summary
In brief, a section 1985(3) cause of action arises when a
member or members of a protected race or class sustain a direct
and immediate injury to his person or property as a consequence
of a conspiracy to discriminate. In the case of an advocate for these
groups, the injury must occur as a consequence of such advocacy.
For the purpose of alleging subject matter jurisdiction, 28
U.S.C. § 1343(1)118 seems sufficient, as does 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4), 119
although at least one court120 has entertained a section 1985(3)
cause of action pursuant to section 1343(3).121 As with the jurisdic-
tional provisions for sections 1343(4) and 1343(3), no mone-
tary minimum is necessary to sustain jurisdiction under section
1343( 1).122
112 But see notes 184-209 and accompanying text infra.
113 See notes 88-89 and accompanying text supra.
"' Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 103 (1971), quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1970).
'15 Compare Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 103 (1971), with Richardson v. Miller,
446 F.2d 1247, 1249 (3d Cir. 1971).
'" See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
1'7 See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
118 28 U.S.C. § 1343(1) (1970) reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person: (1) To recover damages for injury to his
person or property, or because of the deprivation of any right of [sic] privilege of
a citizen of the United States, by any act done in furtherance of any conspiracy
mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42.
119 Set out in full in note 66supra.
120 See Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971).
121 Set out in full in note 86 supra.
122 See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 463-65 (1974).
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III
ISSUES ARISING IN LITIGATION
The most significant issues likely to arise in the litigation of
employment discrimination claims under sections 1981, 1983, and
1985(3) are those of immunity, exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies, Title VII preemption or exclusivity, statute of limitations,
and recovery for injury sustained as a consequence of employment
discrimination.
A. Immunity
The issue of immunity arises when an attempt is made to bring
suit against the government-municipal, state, or federal-or a
governmental official. The doctrine of immunity-which comes
from the ancient notion that the "King can do no wrong"'12 3-
shields the public treasury and the public servant from liability.' 24
Of the various types of immunity claimed by public officials, 125
municipal immunity, 126 eleventh amendment immunity, 127 execu-
tive immunity, 128 and sovereign immunity 29 are most likely to
surface in the area of employment discrimination.
1. Municipal Immunity
The doctrine of municipal immunity precludes the mainte-
nance of a federally cognizable claim under section 1983 against a
municipality' 3" or other political subdivision of a state.' 3 ' A munic-
123 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239, 241 (1974). The modern public policy
underlying the doctrine of immunity is expressed in Mr. Justice Jackson's pithy statement
that "it is not a tort for government to govern." Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57
(1953) (dissenting opinion).
124 See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609
(1963); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). Thus, the
doctrine of immunity relates not merely to the nature or extent of relief possible but also
to the substantive right of action in toto.
125 For example, the doctrines of judicial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity, and legis-
lative immunity still exist. See generally Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
126 See, e.g., Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961).
121 See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Exparte New York, 256 U.S. 490
(1921); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
128 See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). See also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908).
129 See, e.g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com-
merce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
130 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961).
131 Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
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ipality is not a suable "person," as contemplated by Congress,
under section 1983.32 The obstacle of municipal immunity can be
avoided simply by bringing suit against an individual official.1 33
However, since a court will ordinarily look behind the pleadings to
ascertain who the real parties are,134 the complaint must contain
factual allegations that demonstrate personal wrongdoing on the
official's part.13 5
2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Although the eleventh amendment does not specifically bar
suits against a state by its own citizens, 36 the Supreme Court "has
consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits
brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens
of another State.' 137 These decisions reach suits where the state is
the party in fact.' 38 It is also settled that the eleventh amendment
provides no shield for a state official who, under color of state law,
infringes upon the federal rights of another. 39 Ever since Ex parte
Young,' 40 it has been clear that one may enjoin a government offi-
cial who is acting either in excess of authority or pursuant to an
unconstitutional statute.' 4 ' The Young Court noted that an official
acting beyond his authority is "stripped of his official or represen-
tative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences
of his individual conduct.' 142
132 Id. at 707-10. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See also Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967).
133 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
134 Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500 (1921).
135 For example, allegation of an ultra vires act would suffice. See notes 138-41 and
accompanying text infra.
136 The eleventh amendment reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State ....
'37 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). See, e.g.,Exparte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick Ry., 109 U.S. 446 (1883).
138 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500
(1921). See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946).
"' Likewise, Title VII suits brought against states are not constitutionally impermissi-
ble because Congress has expressly authorized a citizen to sue his own state government-
employer for Title VII violations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975); Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 425 U.S. 902 (1976). Note that § 1983 reaches persons acting under color of state law
rather than state governmental, or statutory violations. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
(Supp. V 1975), with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 425 U.S. 902 (1976)
(Title VII actions against Connecticut retirement benefit plan).
140 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
141 See also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974).
142 209 U.S. at 160.
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Although the Young doctrine does not permit a plaintiff to
seek damages from the public treasury, the case does not limit him
to injunctive relief,14 3 although some lower courts have so held. 144
The Supreme Court held in Scheuer v. Rhodes145 that "damages
against individual defendants are a permissible remedy in some
circumstances,"'146 specifically where a citizen is deprived of the
right to vote147 or suffers injury as a consequence of criminal acts
by a public official in the process of discharging his duties.'
48
3. Executive Immunity
In Scheuer the Court also clarified, although not definitively,
49
the extent to which executive immunity shields state officials. The
Court announced that state officials have a qualified executive im-
munity, depending upon the scope of discretion, the responsi-
bilities of the office, and the circumstances surrounding the action
taken. 150 When a state officer acts under color of state law in a
manner violative of the Constitution, his actions will conflict with
the paramount authority of the Constitution.' 5' Such action neces-
sarily becomes one for "judicial inquiry in an appropriate proceed-
ing directed against the individual charged with the trans-
gression."' 5 2 As with the doctrine of Ex parte Young, the doctrine of
' Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974), citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974).
" 4Cf. Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1973) (declaratory judgment),
rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc); Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d
1133, 1137-38 (5th Cir. 1972).
- 5 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
14 6 Id. at 238.
147 Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915), cited in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
238 (1974).
14' See generally Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
149 416 U.S. at 249.
150 Id. at 247.
5 ' Id. at 249. The Court stated:
It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in
light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis
for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of
official conduct.
Id. at 247-48. There are grounds for arguing that a violation of the Civil Rights Acts must
be deemed an ultra vires act per se by an official. See notes 158-59 and accompanying text
infra.
112 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 249 (1974), quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287
U.S. 378, 398 (1932).
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quasi-executive immunity precludes neither damages nor injunc-
tive relief.153
4. Sovereign Immunity
The United States, as a sovereign power, enjoys immunity
from suit15 4 and from incidental costs except where Congress has
otherwise provided. 55 The doctrine of sovereign immunity does
not, however, preclude a plaintiff from bringing suit against an
official of the federal government. Following the doctrine of Ex
parte Young, the Supreme Court held in Dugan v. Rankl' 6 and
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp. 57 that where a plaintiff
sues a federal government official, the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity applies only if the suit is actually one against the United
States. This situation arises if the request for relief would run
against the government's property or funds, or would affect the
official in the exercise of his authorized functions.15 8 Even where
sovereign immunity would otherwise apply, the suit will not be
characterized as one against the United States if "(1) [the chal-
lenged] action by officers [is] beyond their statutory powers and (2)
even though within the scope of their authority, the powers them-
selves or the manner in which they are exercised are constitution-
ally void."' 59 A "violation of Section 1981 by a federal official must
be deemed an ultra vires action on the official's part,"'' 6t and can
therefore result in personal liability, damages, or injunctive
relief.16 1
1'3 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 249 (1974), quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S.
1, 11-12 (1973).
154 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1963); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com-
merce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703-05 (1949).
"' United States v. Worley, 281 U.S. 339, 344 (1930), citing United States v. Chemical
Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 20 (1926). See Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp.,
306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321 (1934).
156 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963).
157 337 U.S. 682, 687-88 (1949).
158 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com-
merce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687-89, 693 (1949).
159 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1963). Accord, Bowers v. Campbell, 505 F.2d
1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1974); Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 703-04 (5th Cir. 1973), revd
on other grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
160 Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1973), revd on other grounds, 497
F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc), quoted in Henry v. Schlesinger, 407 F. Supp. 1179, 1190
(E.D. Pa. 1976). There is nothing to suggest that the ultra vires proposition is limited to
§ 1981, and it is reasonable to argue that a violation of § 1983 or § 1985(3) must also be
deemed an act in excess of a federal official's authority.
161 Because damages are recoverable from a culpable state official under the doctrine
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Justice Blackmun, while still a Circuit Judge, suggested a
method for handling the sovereign immunity issue without resort-
ing to the Dugan-Larson exception. In Gnotta v. United States,162 he
indicated that where Congress provides a federal jurisdictional
basis for a particular cause of action, the argument that the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity bars a federal court from entertaining
the cause of action is a non sequitur. 163 This reasoning prompted
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to hold in Henry v. Schles-
inger164 that the jurisdictional basis for section 1981165 precludes
the sovereign immunity defense in section 1981 actions.
Less than two months after the decision in Henry, however, the
Supreme Court clarified the issue of sovereign immunity in United
States v. Testan.166 Discussing the issue in the context of the Tucker
Act, 167 the Court stated that since the concept of sovereign immu-
nity is substantive rather than jurisdictional, 16 8  a waiver of
sovereign immunity must be found, if at all, in the cause of action
itself rather than in the statute bestowing jurisdiction. 69
Following the Testan reasoning, it is not possible to find a
waiver of sovereign immunity in section 1981 because, like most
of Ex parte Young (see notes 140-42 and accompanying text supra), it would seem to follow
that a plaintiff should also be entitled to damages from an offending federal official. How-
ever, lower courts dealing specifically with the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the
Dugan-Larson exception thereto have not permitted plaintiffs to sue for damages. See, e.g.,
Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 970
(5th Cir. 1974) (en banc). Nevertheless, the policy underlying the immunity concept-that
"it is not a tort for government to govern"-does not preclude recovery of damages by a
federal plaintiff, for it is certainly not the function of government to infringe upon con-
stitutional rights.
162 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970).
163 Acknowledging that the court did not have before it any provision of the Civil
Rights Acts of 1866 or 1871, he stated:
This court, of course, is most familiar with the Jones case. We fail to see its
application here, and we get little assistance from the plaintiff's argument as to its
general applicability. The Joneses did invoke federal jurisdiction under § 1343(4)
but their action, if 42 U.S.C. § 1982 was applicable, was then clearly "authorized
by law". Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. [392 U.S. 409, 412 n.1 (1967)] . . . The
Supreme Court held that § 1982 was applicable. In the present case, there is
nothing comparable to § 1982 unless the Executive Order in question could so
qualify. We have held above that it does not.
415 F.2d at 1278-79. See Henry v. Schlesinger, 407 F. Supp. 1179, 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
164 407 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
165 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970).
166 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
167 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
168 424 U.S. at 399-402.
169 See also note 124 and accompanying text supra.
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other anti-discrimination enactments170 and all constitutional pro-
visions, 17 1 it does not contain an explicit waiver. 172 Section 1981
constitutes a mere "general prohibition of discrimination on racial
grounds, [and] does not constitute a waiver of this immunity.' 73
Section 1985(3), by contrast, does contain language that would
seem to indicate an express waiver of sovereign immunity. The
statute provides that "the party ... injured or deprived may have
an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or
deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.' ' 7 4 It
would thus appear that a plaintiff may bring an action for damages
under section 1985(3) against individual federal co-conspirators, 7 5
without resorting to the Dugan-Larson exception to sovereign im-
munity.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
It is sometimes argued that employees who seek redress for
discriminatory employment practices under section 1981 must ex-
haust all available administrative remedies prior to filing suit in a
federal court.' 76 In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., the
Supreme Court rejected this argument for suits brought under
section 1981 against parties in the private sector. The Court based
its decision on the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments to
Title VII, in which Congress declared that Title VII remedies are
coextensive with the right to sue under section 1981.178
Although Johnson involved acts of discrimination by a private
170 Title VII does provide an express statutory waiver of sovereign immunity in EEO
Act of 1972, § 717(c), 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-16(c) (Supp. V 1975), as does the Back Pay Act, 5
U.S.C. § 5596 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Indeed, one of the stated reasons for the enactment
of the 1972 Amendments to Title VII was to provide some form of relief for federal
employees who were otherwise denied relief on the basis of sovereign immunity. S. REP.
No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1971).
1 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (set out in note 27 supra); U.S CONsT. amend.
XIV (pertinent parts set out in note 34 supra).
172 Section 1981 is set out in text accompanying note 26 supra.
M Penn. v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 703 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 497
F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc); see Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
174 Section 1985(3) is set ouit in text accompanying note 36 supra (emphasis added).
175 See text accompanying notes 187-209 infra.
176 That is, a plaintiff must first lodge a formal complaint with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (1970). If a plaintiff is a federal employee, he must first lodge a formal com-
plaint with an Equal Opportunity counselor. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1975); 5
C.F.R. § 713.214(a)(1) (1976).
177 421 U.S. 454 (1975); accord, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
178 H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2159. See also S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1971).
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employer, its rationale also seems applicable to the federal sector.
Congress intended to provide plaintiffs with alternative causes of
action under Title VII or section 1981, without distinguishing be-
tween federal and non-federal plaintiffs. 7 9 The Supreme Court
imposed just such a distinction, however, in its recent decision in
Brown v. General Services Administration (GSA) .8° Finding a signifi-
cant difference between private and federal employees, the Brown
Court ruled that federal employees may not bring a section 1981
action for employment discrimination.' 8 '
The issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies has also
been raised in connection with section 1983. The remedies at issue
there, in contrast to section 1981, concern adjudication of a
plaintiff's federal claim before state courts or administrative agen-
cies as a condition precedent to the filing of a section 1983 action
in federal district court.' 82 The Supreme Court has decisively ruled
that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to section 1983
actions. 183
C. Title VII Exclusivity or Preemption
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,184 the Supreme Court ob-
served that "the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congres-
sional intent to allow an individual to independently pursue his
rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal
statutes."'1 85 Based on this observation, the Court later held in
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. ,186 that Title VII does not
preempt other remedies available to private employees who bring
job-related racial discrimination suits. Thus, it is well established
119 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975), citing H.R. REP.
No. 238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2137, 2159.
180 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
"I Id. Brown is discussed in detail at notes 184-209 and accompanying text infra.
182 The argument for exhausting remedies in the state courts was first advanced by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
In his view, § 1983 was enacted to provide federal redress for deprivations of federal
rights by state and local officials only if the plaintiff could not obtain redress in the state
courts. He reasoned that any invasion violating federal law was not committed under color
of state law unless the state courts refused to grant an appropriate remedy for the official's
misconduct. Id. at 237.
183 Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814
(1974); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S.
668 (1963). Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
184 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
,
85 Id. at 48.
18 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
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that private employees are not limited to Title VII in seeking re-
dress for employment discrimination.
With respect to federal employees, however, the Court ruled
in Brown v. GSA 187 that section 717 of the Equal Employment Op-
portunities Act of 1972188 constitutes the exclusive individual rem-
edy for job-related racial discrimination. The Court's holding is
puzzling, not only in light of Alexander and Johnson, but also be-
cause Congress indisputably intended to give federal and private
employees equal legal rights in the area of employment dis-
crimination. 189 Curiously, the Court cited this congressional intent
in Chandler v. Roudebush,' 90 decided the same day as Brown, in
holding that federal employees have the same right to a trial de
novo in federal district court as enjoyed by private sector em-
ployees under Title VII.' 9'
The Court in Brown concluded that Congress intended by the
1972 Amendments to create an exclusive, preemptive, administra-
tive and judicial scheme for the redress of federal employment
discrimination. Specifically, the Court pointed to the Senate' 92 and
House Committee Reports, 193 to remarks of Senator Cranston
187 425 U.S. 820 (1976). The split was six to two with Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Brennan, dissenting. Justice Marshall did not take part in considering or deciding the case.
I88 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1975).
189 Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 841 (1976), quoting S. REP. No. 415, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. 16 (1971).
190 425 U.S. 840 (1976).
'9' As Justice Stewart stated fbr a unanimous Court in Chandler:
In 1972 Congress extended the protection of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 . . . to employees of the Federal Government. A principal goal of the
amending legislation, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 .... was
to eradicate "'entrenched discrimination in the Federal service,'" Morton v1.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 547 . . . , by strengthening internal safeguards and by
according "[a]ggrieved [federal] employees or applicants . . . the full rights avail-
able in the courts as are granted to individuals in the private sector under title
VII."
Id. at 841. See Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 835-39 (1976) (dissenting opinion, Stevens, J.).
192 425 U.S. at 827-28. The pertinent part of the Senate Report reads:
The testimony of the Civil Service Commission notwithstanding, the committee
found that an aggrieved Federal employee does not have access to the courts. In
many cases, the employee must overcome a U.S. Government defense of sovereign
immunity or failure to exhaust administrative remedies with no certainty as to the
steps required to exhaust such remedies. Moreover, the remedial authority of the
Commission and the courts has also been in doubt.
S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1971).
193 425 U.S. at 828. The relevant portion of the House Report states, "There is serious
doubt that court review is available to the aggrieved Federal employee. Monetary restitu-
tion or back pay is not attainable. In promotion situations, a critical area of discrimination,
the promotion is often no longer available." H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 25
(1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2160.
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(co-author of the amendment relating to federal employees),' 94
and to remarks of Senator Williams (sponsor and floor manager
of the bill). 195 Both Senators expressed a belief that the 1972
Amendments would, for the first time, give federal employees the
right to sue the federal government for employment discrimina-
tion. This evidence, the Court held, left little doubt that "Congress
was persuaded that federal employees who were treated dis-
criminatorily had no effective judicial remedy"' 96 prior to 1972.
As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissenting opinion, how-
ever, Congress was clearly wrong on the state of the law at the time
of enactment of the 1972 Amendments. Other remedies were
available to federal employees victimized by discriminatory em-
ployment practices. 197 Nevertheless, the majority ruled that "the
relevant inquiry is not whether Congress correctly perceived the
then state of the law, but rather what its perception of the state of
the law was."' 98 The Court cited no precedent in support of this
proposition. In response to petitioner's contention that section 717
was merely designed to supplement other punitive remedies, the
Court stated that the "balance, completeness, and structural integ-
rity of § 717" warranted a finding of exclusivity.' 99 The Court
also invoked the oft-quoted maxim of statutory construction that
"a precisely drawn, detailed statute [i.e., Title VII] pre-empts more
general remedies. 20 0
There seems little question, however, that the Court's decision
in Brown turned almost exclusively on the fact that federal, rather
than private, job discrimination was alleged. Indeed, in distinguish-
ing Johnson, the Brown Court emphasized that it was not dealing
with employment discrimination in the private sector.2°" The con-
siderable support for nonexclusivity in both the legislative history
and the Court's own precedents, makes it clear that the Brown
decision was motivated by more than pure legal analysis.
194 425 U.S. at 828. Senator Cranston stated that the amendment would "[flor the
first time, permit Federal employees to sue the Federal Government in discrimination
cases .... " 118 CONG. REC. 4929 (1972).
19$ 425 U.S. at 828. Senator Williams stated that the amendment "provides, for the
first time, to my knowledge, for the right of an individual to take his complaint to court." 118
CONG. REC. 4922 (1972) (emphasis added).
196 425 U.S. at 828.
197 See notes 1-16 and accompanying text supra.
198 425 U.S. at 828.
199 Id. at 832.
200 Id. at 834.
21 "In Johnson the Court held that in the context of private employment Title VII did
not pre-empt other remedies." Id. at 1968 (emphasis in original).
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The fiscal consequences of providing an "extra" remedy to
federal employees might have influenced the Justices.20 2 Employ-
ment discrimination suits are generally brought as class actions,
often involving thousands of plaintiffs. 20 3 Compensatory and puni-
tive damages-both available under the Reconstruction Acts-can
easily amount to millions of dollars.20 4 In an era of rising federal
deficits and increased demands on the federal budget, the Court
could hardly avoid considering the potential cost of providing
additional relief to victims of employment discrimination at the
federal level. 2 15
Notwithstanding the Brown decision, federal employees may
still be able to obtain immediate relief under the Reconstruction
Acts in some cases of employment discrimination. For example, a
federal employee might still have a cause of action against his
supervisor in the latter's individual capacity for harrassment or
202 Library of Congress researchers have estimated that employment discrimination on
account of race costs the nation $55.8 billion a year in reduced gross national product
equal to 3.7% of the 1975 GNP. Wall St. J., June 22, 1976, at 1, col. 5. The figure, of
course, would be even greater if other forms of invidious employment discrimination (e.g.,
sex and alienage) were included in the study. See also Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1976, at 32, col. I
(Court's docket reflects increased awareness of economic issues).
203 See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Lundlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 836 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976):
At the time of the decrees' entry, hundreds of employment discrimination charges
were pending against the defendants before the EEOC and federal district courts
scattered throughout the country. Between twenty and sixty thousand minority
and female individuals then stood beneath the overlapping umbrellas of these
charges as members of putative aggrieved classes in actions seeking systemic in-
junctive relief and back pay.
204 The steel industry employment discrimination suits have advanced far enough in
litigation to permit estimation of their ultimate cost. With the filing of hundreds of private
class actions alleging job-related bias in the nation's steel industry, the EEOC and the Sec-
retary of Labor in April, 1974, sued nine major steel companies and the United Steel-
workers of America in the federal district court for the Northern District of Alabama. The
EEOC entered into consent decrees with the steel companies and the union separately.
The EEOC-union consent decree did not purport "to bind any individual employee or to
prevent the institution or maintenance of private litigation." United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 836 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
Yet it promised $30.9 million in back pay alone. This consent decree did not reach com-
pensatory or punitive damages because suit was brought under Title VII and Executive
Order 11246 (see note 3 supra), neither of which provides for such damages. See note 219
infra. Similarly, in Cooper v. Allied Chem., Inc., No. 75-2938 (E.D. Pa., filed Oct. 16,
1975), the plaintiff claimed damages to the aggrieved class of $100 million.
25 Lest there be any doubt that the federal government engages in employment dis-
crimination, one need only note that a principal goal of the 1972 Amendments was the
eradication of "entrenched discrimination in the Federal Service." Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 547 (1973), quoting H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1971), re-
printed in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2159.
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other forms of emotional injury sustained as a result of discrimina-
tion on or off the job.2 °6 Plaintiff's counsel must be cautious in
constructing the complaint in such cases-taking care, for example,
to omit class action allegations and Title VII claims-so as to
minimize the chances that the suit will be characterized as an
employment discrimination claim that should have been brought
under Title VII. District court judges who disagree with the Brown
decision or doubt its vitality may be persuaded that the plaintiff is
bringing a private suit for damages against a person who has vio-
lated his civil rights.20 7 The claim could thus survive the critical
pretrial motion stage of the litigation,20 8 after which the chances of
a favorable settlement dramatically increase.20 9
D. Statute of Limitations
There is presently no federal statute of limitations governing
suits brought under sections 1981,210 1983,211 and 1985(3).212
Therefore, the period of limitations is governed by the period set
forth in the most analogous state action; 213 often determined by
considering whether a plaintiff's action sounds in contract 214 or
tort.215
206 See, e.g., Henry v. Schlesinger, 407 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1976). This approach
resembles that required to successfully plead a § 1983 cause of action against a municipal
official without encountering the problem of municipal immunity. Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961). See notes 130-35, and accompanying textsupra.
207 A similar pattern of litigation has developed in response to the problems of munic-
ipal immunity. See notes 130-35 and accompanying textsupra.
200 See notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra.
29 When a suit is not settled, it is often because of a so-called "greedy plaintiff." In
such cases, counsel must work especially hard to force his client to confront the realities of
the case.
""See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975); D. BELL,
supra note 1, at 755.
"21 O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1914); Henig v. Odorioso, 385 F.2d 491, 493 (3d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1016, rehearing denied, 391 U.S. 929 (1968).
2 12 See id.
2 13 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975); D. BELL, supra
note 1, at 755.
214 The rationale behind the contract analogy is that employment discrimination cases
closely resemble state actions based on breaches of contract or tortious interference with
contractual relations. Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 383 F. Supp. 420, 428-32
(E.D. Pa. 1974). Accord, Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d
1011, 1017 n.16 (5th Cir. 1971).
21" The rationale behind the tort analogy is that employment discrimination amounts
to tortious interference with basic statutory rights---for example, in the case of § 1981, "the
right to equality of treatment in employment." Wilson v. Sharon Steel Corp., 399 F. Supp.
403, 408 (W.D. Pa. 1975). See also Holden v. Boston Housing Auth., 400 F. Supp. 399,
400-02 (D. Mass. 1975).
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E. Recovery
The Reconstruction Acts are silent as to the nature of damages
that may be awarded to a successful plaintiff.216 Nevertheless,
courts have awarded punitive damages under sections 1981217 and
1983,218 as well as compensatory damages for pain and suffering.
As already noted, punitive damages are apparently not available to
Title VII plaintiffs, and some courts have also ruled that compen-
satory damage awards are impermissible in Title VII actions. 219
Thus, in terms of recovery, the Reconstruction Acts may, at least in
some cases, be preferable to Title VII.
The possibility of recovering punitive damages against private
defendants is particularly significant in assuring enforcement of
the Acts, since it encourages plaintiffs to seek redress in the many
cases where actual injury is too small to warrant a suit for compen-
satory damages alone. 220 Where the defendant has systematically
engaged in unlawful discrimination-wanton and willful disre-
gard of the plaintiff's rights22 '-punitive damages are justified.222
No reported cases discuss the kinds of damages that may be
awarded under section 1985(3). It seems reasonable to assume,
however, that courts will allow the same kinds of damages under
1985(3) as under the other Reconstruction Acts, especially since
216 Section 1981 is set out in text accompanying notes 25-26 supra, § 1983 is set out in
text accompanying notes 31-32 supra, and § 1985(3) is set out in text accompanying notes
35-36 supra. See also Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 75, 85 (3d Cir. 1965).
21' See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975), citing
Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); Mansell v.
Saunders, 372 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1967).
216 See, e.g., Mansell v. Saunders, 372 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 1967); Basista v. Weir,
340 F.2d 74, 84-88 (3d Cir. 1965).
219 For example, under Tide VII a court, upon proof of an intentional violation of the
statute, may award back pay for a period not to exceed the two-year period prior to the
filing of the charge with the adiminstrative agency, and order "such affirmative action as
may be appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975). See Johnson v. Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 458 (1975); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 763 (1976); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975). Some courts
have ruled that neither compensatory nor punitive damages may be awarded in Title VII
suits. See cases cited in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 458-59 n.5
(1975), for the proposition that only restitutionary and other equitable remedies-e.g., in-
junctive relief-are available under Title VII. Jiron v. Sperry Rand Corp., 10 Fair Emp.
Prac. Cas. 730, 736-40 (D. Utah 1975). It seems, however, that since the purpose of recov-
ery under Title VII is "to bring one group of employees up to the economic level of
another," compensatory damages could be imposed. Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.,
477 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1973).
220 See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 523 (1885).
221 See Wright v. Kaine Realty, 352 F. Supp. 222, 223 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
222 See Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1974).
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1985(3) is derived from the same parent statute as section 1983,223
under which both compensatory and punitive damages have con-
sistently been awarded.
Filing suit under the Reconstruction Acts thus presents two
benefits. First, the aggrieved party may recover full compensation.
Second, the possibility of punitive damage awards provides a
greater deterrent to employment discrimination, thus advancing
the national goal of equal employment opportunity.
CONCLUSION
The Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 can be extremely use-
ful tools for the lawyer who seeks to end the injustices of dis-
criminatory employment practices. Successful litigation under the
Acts requires precision and foresight in constructing the complaint,
in order to assure survival of the action beyond the pretrial stage.
Considering the vulnerability of other types of employment dis-
crimination actions to pretrial dismissal, and the possibility of com-
pensatory and punitive damages under the Reconstruction Acts,
the latter can prove indispensable in planning successful actions to
combat employment discrimination.
223 See notes 31-37 and accompanying text supra.
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